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Summary: The constitutions of the old and new Member States offer a wide range of models in terms of their adjustment for EU membership, with a number of them containing minimal or even no references to the EU. This paper highlights the importance of adequate amendments in light of selected recent judgments by the highest courts in Poland, Estonia and Latvia, where judges have found themselves in the rather vexed situation of having to fi nd pragmatic solutions to ensure the constitutionality of legislation without jeopardising the supremacy of EC law. In this process, certain constitutional provisions that confl ict with EC/EU law appear to have been put on hold, prompting the question of whether a move towards greater 'constitutional amorphousness' has tacitly been accepted by virtue of EU accession.

Introduction: Minimalism of constitutional amendments in CEE Member States
In the process of EU entry, it is incumbent upon the accession countries to align their legislation to the requirements of the wide-ranging acquis communautaire, under careful scrutiny by the EU. There is, however, one important legal instrument which appears to be virtually exempt from harmonisation: the national constitution. As a fundamental expression of state sovereignty, constitutions establish basic rules on the distribution of powers and decision-making within a state. States therefore hold the prerogative of determining whether and to what extent membership in the EU should be mentioned in their national constitutions. The latest enlargements, however, have offered some evidence of nascent inroads by the EU into national autonomy with regard to determining the content of constitutions. Examples include the European Commission's demands for amendment of constitutional provisions on the judiciary in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, and for adjustment of the rules on the national currency in Estonia. However, core constitutional provisions on the organisation of powers and their transfer to the EU remain fi rmly within the remit of the Member States.
In the absence of unifi ed EU requirements, national constitutions represent an area of law which, intriguingly, appears to be rather poorly adapted to EU membership. Of the constitutions of the 15 'old' Member States, 1 four offer no mention of the EU -the constitutions of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and Spain. Indeed, Monica Claes has noted that, were an alien to land in these countries and read their constitutions, he might well fail to notice their EU membership altogether. 2 Three other constitutions -those of Finland, Belgium and (since 2001) Italy -accommodate the transfer of powers under a broader clause on international organisations, but make explicit references to the EU in relation to a limited number of specifi c issues. The third group, which best commends itself as a model for accession countries, consists of constitutions that contain explicit provisions on the delegation or transfer of powers to the European Union -those of France, Germany, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, Sweden and (after the 2001 reform) Greece. Besides the transfer clauses, most constitutions in this group contain further provisions dealing with specifi c aspects of EU membership, such as control by the national parliament over the government in the EU decision-making process, active and passive voting rights of EU citizens in local council elections in another Member State and elections for the European Parliament, and issues related to the Monetary Union. 3 As regards the new Member States that joined the EU in 2004, the author has provided a detailed overview of the constitutional amendments elsewhere, characterising them broadly as minimalist for the reasons which follow. 4 Firstly, in the majority of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the amendments have been addressed to international organisations generally, rather than to the European Union explicitly. For instance, the new Article 10a of the Constitution of the Czech Republic provides that '[s]ome powers […] may be transferred to an international organisation or institution'. Poland's 1997 Constitution provides that Poland may 'delegate to an international organisation or international institution the competence of organs of state authority in re-lation to certain matters' (Art 90(1)). The same approach has been taken in Latvia and Slovenia, although in Latvia a referendum for entry into the European Union was also specifi cally envisaged. Lithuania joined the EU under its existing provisions on international organisations (Art 136); a free-standing Constitutional Act on Lithuania's membership in the European Union was additionally adopted shortly after accession in July 2004, authorising the delegation of state competences to the EU. Only in Slovakia (Art 7(2)) and Hungary (Art 2A) did the provisions of constitutional amendments expressly address the European Union.
The second aspect of minimalism concerns the range of issues which led to the amendments. While a relatively extensive range of amendments were introduced in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary, in the remaining four CEE countries manifest confl icts with EU law in their constitutions were left unresolved, contrary to the advice of legal experts. In Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, however, the amendment process was to some extent resumed after accession, in the less politically charged post-referendum climate. Besides the delegation of powers, the following main issues have now been addressed in the constitutions of CEE Member States, together with their later amendments: 12 Art 70(4) of the Hungarian Constitution. 13 Art 120(2) of the Slovak Constitution; this provision also permits the imposition of duties upon citizens by government decree. A provision on the implementation of EU obligations was also introduced into Lithuania's Constitutional Act on EU Membership in July 2004.
14 Art 32D(1) of the Hungarian Constitution. ments in Romania and Bulgaria, the 2007 accession countries, appear to run counter to this minimalist trend. In October 2003 Romania adopted a remarkably comprehensive package of amendments addressed specifi cally to the EU. Central to this is the new Title V 1 on 'Euro-Atlantic Integration' (Art 145 1 ), which allows the transfer of 'certain powers' to Community institutions, provides for the application and precedence of EC law, and envisages parliament's control over the government in EU affairs. Elsewhere in the Romanian Constitution there are amendments concerning issues such as EU citizens' voting rights in local elections, the election of European Parliament members, the extradition of Romanian citizens, the right of non-nationals to acquire land, and the possibility of adopting the common currency. Bulgaria's constitutional amendments permit the country to 'participate in the establishment and development of the European Union', and additionally address issues such as the land ownership regime, the ban on the extradition of citizens, and the active and passive voting rights of EU citizens in local and European Parliament elections.
The third aspect, procedural minimalism, is specifi c to the Baltic countries. Here the amendment process proved rather diffi cult and controversial, because rigid constitutional amendment procedures required a referendum to amend the constitutional articles on sovereignty and independence. This requirement proved too challenging to comply with in the process of EU accession, against a background of public support for EU membership that was consistently the lowest among the candidate countries, while the issue of delegation of sovereignty sparked controversy due to these countries' recently regained independence. Estonia and Lithuania adopted free-standing constitutional acts rather than amendments to the texts of their constitutions, Lithuania doing so only after accession. Latvia created a special referendum for EU accession, with a reduced turnout requirement.
Overall, the amendments in Central and Eastern Europe may thus broadly be described as minimal, albeit in different respects in different countries, and with some improvements later in the post-accession period. As accession referendums were imminent at the time, it was probably essential to keep a low profi le concerning constitutional revision, as a wider range of amendments could have fuelled the eurosceptics' outcries about loss of sovereignty. Additional reasons for minimal amendments included the sheer diffi culty of amendment procedures in some countries and the prevalence of traditional theoretical views on sovereignty, which fed into the 'international organisation' approach. 15 While shortcomings in the adjustment of constitutions are, as seen above, a matter of national discretion, and will not trigger any sanctions from the EU, they do have at least two important ramifi cations for Member States' internal legal systems, which will be the main focus of this paper. Firstly, courts, and in particular constitutional courts, may fi nd themselves in the rather vexed situation of having to fi nd pragmatic solutions to ensure the constitutionality of legislation without jeopardising the supremacy of EC law. To this end, the paper will consider the Polish were annulled on the ground of their incompatibility with Article 55 of the Polish Constitution. This provision, which expressly prohibits the extradition of Polish nationals, had not been amended prior to EU accession, despite numerous calls to that effect. The Tribunal displayed considerable resourcefulness in granting the Polish Parliament an 18-month period during which extradition could continue while the Constitution was amended. In another decision to be considered here, the Tribunal was presented with 14 alleged confl icts between the Constitution and the Polish Accession Treaty.
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It will be seen that the Tribunal rejected all of these, at the same time making a strong statement about supremacy which has been perceived as representative of 'unconditional national constitutional sovereignty'.
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As Sadurski astutely notes, such a move, which displayed a striking contrast between its 'Euro-friendly' outcome and 'Europe-unfriendly' tone, was aimed at simultaneously reassuring several audiences, by placating political forces concerned about the surrender of sovereignty, on the one hand, while on the other ensuring compatibility with obligations arising from EU membership.
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The paper will also consider judgments by the highest courts in Estonia and Latvia, where the courts had to gloss over certain questionable practices in the constitutional amendment procedure, due to the lack of any room to manoeuvre.
Examination of these cases will lead us to the second and more fundamental point, namely, whether a move towards greater 'constitutional amorphousness' has been tacitly accepted by virtue of EU accession. With constitutional courts glossing over clashes with EC/EU law in their quest to fi nd pragmatic, EU-friendly solutions, it appears that the CEE Member States' constitutions, which have hitherto provided a robust basis for vigorous constitutional review frequently leading to annulments of incompatible national acts, may have partly been reduced to paper tigers, with provisions confl icting with EU law put on hold.
Constitutionality challenges in Poland
The Accession Treaty case: EU-friendly interpretation
By way of background to the case studies that follow, it should be mentioned that Poland adopted a new constitution in 1997, with Article 90(1) allowing the country to delegate certain competences to international organisations, and Article 91 establishing the direct effect and supremacy of ratifi ed international agreements and EC secondary law. 21 However, there were calls to amend the Polish Constitution prior to EU accession, so as to remove certain confl icts with regard to EC/EU law which might nonetheless arise.
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The problematic provisions included Article 62(1), under which voting rights in local elections are the preserve of Polish citizens; Article 227(1), which grants the National Bank of Poland the exclusive right to issue Polish currency; and Articles 52(4) and 55, which prohibit the extradition of Polish citizens. However, amending the Constitution would have posed the risk of strengthening nationalist anti-EU movements ahead of the accession referendum which was then imminent, with public support for accession already at a borderline 50 percent. Furthermore, it would have been diffi cult to secure the necessary political support, as constitutional amendments required the approval of two parliamentary chambers, and involved the possibility of holding a referendum. According to the Tribunal, the Polish Constitution is the supreme act establishing the legal basis for the existence of the Polish State; however, it does not apply to structures other than the Polish State. Under Articles 90(1) and (3) of the Constitution, in combination with the Accession Treaty, certain powers were delegated to the EU level; reviewing the acts of EU bodies is a matter for EU law, and Polish implementing provisions and the Constitution may not be deployed in order to review the constitutionality of political decision-making at the EU level.
A similar pragmatic approach followed in the Accession Treaty case.
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The claimants, who came from among three political groups in the Sejm that were opposed to Poland's EU membership, argued that a number of provisions in the Accession Treaty and EC/EU Treaties were in confl ict with the Polish Constitution, particularly with the constitutional principles of the sovereignty of the Polish people and the supremacy of the Constitution within Poland's legal system. The fourteen alleged confl icts arose, inter alia, from the right of EU citizens to vote and stand in both European Parliament and municipal elections, the adoption of the common currency, and changes affecting the separation of powers.
It is telling that the Tribunal dismissed all fourteen of these claims. As regards municipal elections, the Tribunal held that the aforementioned Article 4 (on the sovereignty of the Polish people) does not encompass local elections, and that Article 62(1), which guarantees to Polish citizens the right to elect, inter alia, representatives to local self-government bodies, does not preclude the possibility of also according this right to citizens of other states. The Tribunal equally rejected the applicants' claim that the powers of the European Central Bank are in confl ict with Article 227(1) of the Polish Constitution, which establishes the National Bank of Poland as the central bank of the state and vests in it the exclusive right to issue money and to formulate and implement monetary policy. This claim was rejected because Article 105 of the EC Treaty, which deals with these matters, is not of a self-executing nature. Importantly for the purposes of this paper, the Tribunal stated that when Poland adopts the common currency in the future, a decision may well be required to amend the Polish Constitution in this respect. Another interesting point was that the claimants also raised the issue of the constitutionality of potential future introduction of same-sex marriages, an issue that has generated much controversy in this strongly Catholic country. According to Article 18 of the Polish Constitution, marriage is a union between a man and woman. The Tribunal dismissed this claim by noting that the current wording of Article 13 EC does not pertain to the institution of marriage as such; any future change in this respect would, however, require amendment of the Polish Constitution.
The Tribunal also made a strong statement about the supremacy of the Polish Constitution, which has become the best-known part of this judgment. However, it is important to underline the fact that all of the claims above were rejected, as this demonstrates the Tribunal's endeavour to interpret national provisions in an EU-friendly way, even though at times its interpretation may appear rather far-fetched to an outside observer. The part of the decision concerning supremacy was closely conditioned by the Tribunal's decision in the European Arrest Warrant case, which was made two weeks before the Accession Treaty decision. In order to fully understand the Tribunal's statements on supremacy, we will fi rst examine the EAW decision and then return to the supremacy aspect of the Accession Treaty decision.
The European Arrest Warrant decision: Limits to interpretation
The cases above having offered ample evidence of the Polish Tribunal's EU-friendly approach, the focus will now turn to the European Arrest Warrant decision, 
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The Tribunal held that, despite numerous procedural differences between extradition and surrender, the two procedures are very similar in substance. 31 Thus, according to the judges, the surrender procedure is but a variation on extradition, and the prohibition enshrined in Article 55 of the Constitution is, therefore, fully applicable to both procedures. Furthermore, the Constitutional Tribunal argued that a pro-European interpretation of this provision is not possible, as the principles of supremacy and indirect effect do not apply to third-pillar legislation (the Pupino decision had yet to be delivered by the ECJ 32 ), and in any event ECJ jurisprudence has placed limitations on the principle of indirect effect, especially as regards aggravating criminal liability.
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As a consequence, the implementing provision in the Penal Procedure Code was declared unconstitutional. However, the Tribunal did not bar extradition, instead granting Parliament an 18-month transitional period during which the Constitution was to be amended, and the surrender of Polish nationals could continue.
Although this case concerned the third pillar, where EU law does not enjoy supremacy, the Tribunal's judgment is regarded as sitting somewhat uneasily with the Pupino judgment delivered shortly afterwards by the ECJ. 30 For information on the factual background, see Łazowski (n 28) 573ff. 31 See Łazowski (n 28) 574ff, especially 576-577. 32 See n 34 and accompanying text. 33 apply to the third pillar; the Polish EAW decision had excluded indirect effect from this domain. However, these judgments could nonetheless be regarded as compatible, given that Pupino places certain limits on indirect effect, including the rule that indirect effect should not lead to contra legem interpretation. Indeed, given the Constitutional Tribunal's inability to interpret the Polish Constitution in light of the Framework Decision without going contra legem, it appears to have been permissible to grant priority to the Polish Constitution.
In any event, the 18-month transitional period it granted proves that the Tribunal essentially sought to ensure an EU-friendly, pragmatic approach, 35 especially in light of its previous case law considered above. Indeed, the Tribunal emphasised that the Polish legislature should 'give the highest priority' to ensuring the functioning of the EAW system. 36 Moreover, the explicit prohibition of extradition in the Constitution clearly left the Tribunal with no room to manoeuvre. As seen above, other provisions allowed a certain measure of interpretation, and indeed were interpreted by the Tribunal as either compatible with EC law (eg provisions on voting rights) or requiring amendment in a more distant future (eg provisions on the Central Bank in the event of Poland's adoption of the common currency). However, Article 55(1), which was formulated as a rule rather than a principle, 37 left the Court's hands rather tied.
The Polish decision can be further contextualised by comparing it with decisions by the constitutional courts of some other Member States, which have equally faced controversial issues and asserted their prerogatives with regard to the third pillar. Indeed, in November 2005 the Supreme Court of Cyprus annulled a national implementing law, based on reasoning that closely followed the Polish EAW decision.
38
In Germany, the Constitutional Court declared a national law implementing the European Arrest Warrant unconstitutional in July 2005, on the ground that the margins afforded by the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant had not been exhausted in such a way as to ensure the highest possible consideration for the protection of fundamental rights. 36 English summary of Judgment in Case P 1/05 (n 16) para 17. 37 See Komárek (n 35) 12. Komárek has observed that the Polish Tribunal acted in a much more pro-European way than did its German counterpart: fi rstly, the latter was not forced to decide on an explicit confl ict between Germany's Basic Law and a provision of EU law; and, secondly, whereas the Polish Tribunal had used all its powers to avoid the negative consequences of such a confl ict, the German court was not quite so cautious about the consequences of its judgment for the European legal order. In addition, the ECJ was seized with a question on the validity of the EAW Framework Decision itself. The Belgian Cour d'Arbitrage made a preliminary reference concerning the legal basis of the Framework Decision and the compatibility with fundamental rights of abolishing the dual criminality rule; the ECJ upheld the legality of the measure. 43 Against this background, the Tribunal went on to emphasise, in the previously discussed Accession Treaty decision that followed two weeks later, 44 that in some cases limits to interpretation may exist. In this decision, the Tribunal began by reiterating the requirement 'to respect and be sympathetically predisposed towards appropriately shaped regulations of international law binding upon the Republic of Poland', in line with Article 9 of the Constitution. 45 Moreover, the Tribunal developed a version of the pluralist approach to relations between EC and national law, stating that, unlike traditional dualism and monism, EC law has created a new situation 'wherein, within each Member State, autonomous legal orders co-exist and are simultaneously operative'.
46
It also underscored the assumption of mutual loyalty between EC/EU institutions and the Member States, which creates 'a duty for the Member States to show the highest standard of respect for Community norms', but also 'a duty for the ECJ to be sympathetically disposed towards the national legal systems'. 44 Judgment in Case K 18/04 (n 18). 45 English summary of Judgment in Case K 18/04 (n 18) para 10. 46 Ibid para 12. 47 Ibid para 16.
However, it then went on to state that, under the explicit wording of Article 8(1) of the Polish Constitution, the Constitution remains supreme, and that there are limits to interpreting domestic legislation in a manner sympathetic to European law. 48 In certain circumstances, an irreconcilable inconsistency may emerge between a constitutional norm and a Community norm, which cannot be removed by means of interpretation. 49 Such cases cannot lead to the constitutional norm losing its binding force (eg norms protecting fundamental rights), or applying only to areas outside the scope of Community law. In the case of such explicit confl icts, Parliament must decide on the appropriate manner of resolving the inconsistency, with three options at its disposal: amendment of the Constitution, renegotiation of the EU measure, or, ultimately, Poland's withdrawal from the Union.
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The EAW decision shows us the importance for other institutional actors to take their role in 'cooperative constitutionalism' seriously. Since there were genuine limits to interpretation, the Tribunal sent a clear message to Parliament to amend the Constitution. As Komárek puts it, the question will shift from who […] the fi nal arbiter in the EU legal order is […] to what the limits of law are. In other words, we will have to ask different questions: to what extent the confl ict can be decided by the courts (and by their interpretation of law) and what should be left to the other constitutional discourse actors, these actors being not only politicians, but also the legal/constitutional doctrine and the public at large. 51 Indeed, as seen above, several other new Member States had amended their constitutions in order to accommodate the European Arrest Warrant system. As a matter of fact, in the follow-up to the EAW decision the Polish president submitted a bill on revision of Article 55 of the Polish Constitution, according to which the extradition ban was to be maintained, subject, however, to the exceptions set forth in international treaties. This amendment was adopted on 8 September 2006.
Estonia and Latvia: Cases contesting the constitutional amendment procedure
Apart from Poland, the adequacy of constitutional amendments has also been addressed by the highest courts in Estonia and Latvia, where 48 Ibid para 14. 49 Ibid para 13. 50 Ibid para 13.
51 Komárek (n 35) 25. not only the substance of constitutional provisions but also the very means of amending the constitution had been contested.
Estonia
As in Poland, there had been calls from various quarters in Estonia to amend certain provisions of the national constitution prior to accession, most authoritatively by the Constitutional Expert Commission in 1998.
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These included Article 1 of the Constitution, which declares the eternity and inalienability of Estonia's sovereignty and independence; Article 48, which reserves membership in political parties to Estonian citizens; and Article 111, according to which the Bank of Estonia has the exclusive right to emit Estonia's currency. However, due to low public support for EU membership in the years preceding the accession referendum, and the extremely arduous constitutional amendment procedure, amending the Constitution became a political rather than a legal issue, with the question of amending Article 1 increasingly exploited by eurosceptic movements. Against this backdrop, then-Prime Minister Mart Laar expressed uncertainty as to whether a constitutional amendment was necessary at all, 53 and it was unclear until 2001 whether a referendum would be held. Eventually the Constitution was, strictly speaking, not amended but rather 'supplemented' by a separate Act Supplementing the Constitution 54 (hereinafter the 'Supplementing Act'). The Act laconically authorises Estonia's membership in the EU (Art 1) and states that the Constitution is to be 'applied, taking into consideration the rights and obligations deriving from the Accession Treaty' (Art 2). The Act was approved in a referendum on 14 September 2003, in which two referendums − on accession and on 'supplementing' the Constitution -were fused into one, following an amendment to the Referendum Act. According to the accompanying media coverage, no harm to Estonia's sovereignty was posed by the Act.
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A number of constitutional complaints were brought to the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, with regard to both the means of constitutional revision and substantive confl icts with EC law. As regards the former, nine cases in total were brought to the Supreme 52 Constitutional Expert Commission, 'Potential Accession to the European Union and its Consequences for Estonian Constitutional Law' (Tallinn, 1998) (in Estonian; on fi le with the author). Court following the accession referendum.
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In essence, these claimed that (a) the Constitution only allows 'amendment' of its text, not its 'supplementation' by a separate act; (b) it is impossible to retain 'eternal and inalienable independence' (Art 1 of the Constitution), while transferring part of it to the European Union, and thus the referendum question contained two mutually exclusive parts; (c) ratifi cation of the Accession Treaty was unconstitutional, as it should have been preceded by amendment of Article 1 of the Constitution (which in turn would require a referendum); and (d) the new type of referendum was incompatible with the Constitution and the Referendum Act. All these claims were rejected by the Constitutional Review Chamber on procedural grounds.
While these cases appear to have been based on legitimate grounds deriving from the national constitution, their outcome refl ects the pragmatic efforts of judges in a very small Member State not to 'rock the boat', given their new role as European as well as national judges. Although the Supplementing Act should inevitably be seen in the context of geopolitical and economic imperatives for joining the EU, some broader questions have been raised about the correctness of such a solution.
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This criticism pertains in particular to the potential devaluation of Estonia's clear, directly applicable and up-to-date Constitution; the circumvention of rigid amendment procedures; and the failure to demarcate the EU's infl uence on the exercise of constitutional powers and to remove manifest confl icts between the Constitution and EU law.
As regards substantive confl icts with EC law, the Constitutional Review Chamber was seized in April 2005 with a case regarding the electoral rights of EU citizens. Namely, the contested provision would not, in effect, ensure equal opportunities for an EU citizen standing as a candidate in local elections. The petition was dismissed on procedural grounds: there was no legal basis for declaring a national law invalid in abstracto on the ground of a confl ict with EC law. Despite the applicant's reference to constitutional norms, the Court held that the provision had, in essence, been contested on the ground of its compatibility with EC law. In addition, the Court pointed out, with reference to the ECJ's decision in IN.CO.GE. '90, 62 that a national act which confl icts with EC law could simply be set aside in a specifi c dispute. The Supreme Court's decision was criticised in a dissenting opinion, which argued that the Court should have requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on interpretation of Article 19 EC, so as to ascertain whether this article includes the right to membership in political parties. The dissenting opinion also expressed regret that Estonia's highest court had not seized the opportunity to explain the meaning and implications of the Supplementing Act and, in so doing, to enhance legal certainty.
The Supreme Court's decision appears to convey a measure of uneasiness with regard to the meaning and place of the Supplementing Act in the Estonian constitutional order. At the time of its adoption, the Act had provoked considerable controversy among lawyers.
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It seems as if the judges deliberately refused to take a stance on the Act, which was widely perceived as a political compromise in order to make EU accession possible. As in the Polish European Arrest Warrant case, the Constitutional Review Chamber thus sent a message to Estonia's Parliament, suggesting that it might wish to adopt clear legislative provisions on this matter. According to the Constitutional Review Chamber:
The legislator is competent to decide whether it wants to regulate the procedure for declaring invalid Estonian legislation which is in confl ict with European Union law, just as the legislator is free to choose whether it will or will not give the Chancellor of Justice the right to review the conformity of national legislation with European Union law.
One year later, however, the Constitutional Chamber was nonetheless forced to clarify the meaning of the Supplementing Act, following Parliament's express request relating to the aforementioned Article 111 of the Constitution, according to which the Bank of Estonia has the exclusive right to issue Estonian currency. The European Commission had earlier called on the Estonian Government to amend the Article; however, the Government insisted that Article 111 did not constitute an obstacle to adopting the common currency, when read together with the Supplementing Act. The Constitutional Chamber upheld this view in its opinion of 11 May 2006, 64 stating that the Draft Act Amending the Bank of Estonia Act, which made preparatory arrangements for eventual adoption of the euro, was compatible with the Constitution. In addition, the Court also directly addressed the position of the Supplementing Act in the context of the supremacy of EC law, stating that the text of the Constitution should be read together with the Supplementing Act, and that those parts of the Constitution incompatible with EC law should not be applied. By virtue of this statement, the Court appears, in fact, to have granted unconditional supremacy to EC law.
It should be noted that, following the numerous controversies surrounding the role of the Supplementing Act in Estonia's constitutional order, an increasing number of prominent lawyers and politicians have called for a wider EU-related amendment package, to be introduced directly into the text of the Constitution, or even for the adoption of a new constitution.
Latvia
The Latvian Constitutional Court has likewise had to address cases pertaining to the correctness of the means by which Latvia's Constitution was amended in view of EU accession, and has taken an equally pragmatic approach. As in Estonia (and also Lithuania), in Latvia the Constitution requires a referendum to amend its Articles 1 and 2 on sovereignty and independence. However, due to concerns similar to those in Estonia, the amendment was carried out by way of parliamentary procedure in May 2003. The amended Article 68 allows Latvia to delegate part of its competences to 'international institutions'. In addition, a new type of referendum was introduced for EU accession: whereas a constitutional amendment referendum requires, under Article 79, a minimum turnout of 50 percent, the new EU referendum merely required the participation of at least half the number of voters who participated in the previous parliamentary elections, of whom a majority had to vote in favour. A referendum was also envisaged for 'substantial changes' in the terms of membership; this expression was meant to include potential secession from the EU. Such a move rested on the argument that no harm to the principles of sovereignty and independence, established in Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution, would ensue from EU accession. 65 However, scholars argued that a wider constitutional revision was necessary, 66 particularly as regards enabling the extradition of Latvian citizens and granting EU citizens the right to vote in municipal elections. Amendment of these issues did indeed follow after Latvia's accession.
This method of constitutional amendment prompted the submission of fi ve petitions to the Constitutional Court in November 2003, 67 claiming that Parliament was not authorised to adopt these amendments without prior amendment of Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitution. The petitions contested the constitutionality of both the amendments and the accession referendum, as well as of the Accession Treaty. The Constitutional Court declared the petitions inadmissible on the ground that the applicants had failed to substantiate a violation of their fundamental rights under the Constitution. It also noted that the choice of constitutional amendment procedure rested with Parliament, the Court having no competence to assess the conformity of one norm of the Constitution with another or with the Constitution as a whole. When a norm has been incorporated into the Constitution, it forms an integral part thereof and enjoys the corresponding legal force.
relationship between Community and national legal orders. 71 The cases considered in this paper demonstrate that, in certain situations, genuine limits to EU-friendly interpretation may well exist, and that in such cases courts in CEE Member States have instead engaged in dialogue with national parliaments regarding the need to remove manifest confl icts with EU law from national constitutions. 72 Indeed, in a number of cases in both old and new Member States where a confl ict between EC law and national constitutional law has narrowly been averted, constitutional courts appear to have been saddled with an unduly high burden in seeking a pragmatic solution. With the courts' hands thus tied by the constraints of EU membership, the role of political institutions, especially parliaments, assumes particular importance with regard to exercising self-control and extra prudence when drafting constitutional amendments. Furthermore, action at the political rather than the judicial level is also mandated by concerns about legal certainty and clarity for citizens, as well as broader concerns about legitimacy.
Such a change in focus is also warranted if the constitutional culture which prevailed prior to EU accession is to be sustained. The judgments considered in this paper, while taking a favourable approach towards participation in the European Union, seem to reinforce concerns that had been voiced earlier regarding a certain degree of devaluation of the constitutions in Central and Eastern European countries in the process of European integration. 73 Constitutions in general have been classifi ed according to two main types, 'historic' and 'revolutionary'. 74 The former, which include the British and Dutch constitutions, for example, have developed incrementally over a long-term period; they are non-formalistic, and at least as much political as legal by nature. In contrast, 'revolutionary' constitutions, including those of Germany, Italy, France and Ireland, tend to have originated in a political or social cataclysm that forms the 'moving myth' which inspires them; these constitutions represent a political reality, and tend to have a distinctly legal character enforced by constitutional courts. 75 The constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe belong to the second group. As a reaction to the Communist period, marked by a nihilistic attitude to constitutional rules, they have a distinctly legal sations in general. The constitutions of Germany, France, Portugal and, among the new Member States, Slovakia and Romania are particularly well suited to offer such examples. It is worth bearing in mind that 'there is life after accession ', 82 and that, more fundamentally, the broader nature and credibility of a constitution may well be at stake when choosing the course of action. 82 Comment by M Claes at the Zagreb University conference mentioned in the preliminary footnote to this paper.
